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RONALD C. GRIFFIN*
Engaging Irrigation Organizations
in Water Reallocation**
ABSTRACT
Rising water scarcity in the Western United States cannot be well
addressed without strong reallocation of agriculturally assigned
water rights. Irrigation organizations are necessary participants in
this process. This article examines the special conditions and
problems of improving the reallocative activities of these agencies
and reviews historical background and challenges. Finally, this ac-
ticle discusses policy options.
I. INTRODUCTION
Reallocation of agriculturally assigned water rights is a major
strategy for addressing rising water scarcity in the Western United
States.1 Therefore, when urban and environmental water demand groups
cannot bargain with irrigators for mutually beneficial water realloca-
tions, all parties are denied potential welfare-improving opportunities.
Society suffers. This is the situation established by the policies placed
upon, or pursued by, many irrigation organizations. User-to-user bar-
gaining is commonly inoperative in cases where irrigation organizations
(IOs),2 not member farmers, own or restrict agricultural water rights.3 In
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1. NAT’L RES. COUN. WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT, 26 (1992); WESTERN WATER POLICY REVIEW ADVISORY COMMISSION, WATER IN
THE WEST: THE CHALLENGE FOR THE NEXT CENTURY, 2-40 (1998), available at http://wwa.
colorado.edu/western_water_law/docs/WaterintheWest_WPPRAC.pdf.
2. IOs include a range of irrigation-focused water utilities that deliver water to farms.
They can be operated as corporate or cooperative organizations. Most are nonprofit
entities.
3. User-to-user bargaining is arguably broken on the urban utility side as well, in that
urban authorities contract for water acquisitions on behalf of their customers. Yet, house-
holds and most other urban clients use relatively small amounts of water, both in absolute
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the absence of user-to-user bargaining, efficiency in water use is difficult
to achieve via alternative policies. Calls for institutional change to im-
prove these conditions have been present for some time,4 and the driving
resource pressures are not subsiding. The advance of both water and en-
ergy scarcities continually enhances the severity of this issue.5
Modern policy should not only activate an efficient suite of water
conservation measures, but irrigators must be exposed to a full slate of
accurate incentives because of the status of agriculture as an energy user,
food supplier, and bioenergy supplier asks that. If irrigators are shielded
from water’s true value, they risk skewing cropping selections and pro-
duction practices in an era where food prices promise to rise in response
to climate change and energy costs.6 Cost-effective production of the
right foodstuffs is a matter of rising consequences as is the establishment
of efficient energy and water use practices.7
This article first considers the path to the present conditions by
discussing the different classes of IOs and their historical background. It
then delves into the existing rules bearing upon IO water transfers and
observes how the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation’s (BOR) policies are resis-
tant to change, thereby limiting reallocation. Next, both the pros and
cons of obstructing water trade for IOs are identified. There are several
considerations to keep in mind, such as the effects that water transfera-
bility has on agricultural production. The article then inventories pos-
sibilities for water policy reform, discussing the remedial options for
establishing value-signaling contact with actual irrigators.
terms and relative to the overall use within the utility, and they are not interested in con-
ducting water right negotiations on their own behalf. Signaling urban clients about the
value of water is a comparative advantage for nonmarket policies, especially for the man-
ner in which utilities can factor water value into the rates charged to clients. There is a well
developed economic literature indicating that, in lieu of household activity in water mar-
kets, efficiency in urban use is achievable by scarcity-inclusive water rates and new connec-
tion fees incorporating water right values. See Ronald C. Griffin, Effective Water Pricing, 37 J.
OF THE AM. WATER RES. ASSN., 1335, 1335–47 (October 2001); see also WILLIAM E. MARTIN ET
AL., SAVING WATER IN A DESERT CITY 39 (1984) (These rate modernization concepts are ex-
tendable to irrigation organizations.).
4. MICHA GISSER & RONALD N. JOHNSTON, WATER RIGHTS: SCARCE RESOURCE ALLOCA-
TION, BUREAUCRACY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 137–65, (Terry L. Anderson ed., 1983); see also
RODNEY T. SMITH, WATER RIGHTS: SCARCE RESOURCE ALLOCATION, BUREAUCRACY, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 167–217, (Terry L. Anderson ed., 1983); NAT’L RES. COUN., WATER TRANSFERS
IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT, 96–98 (1992).
5. See Robert H. Abrams & Noah D. Hall, Framing Water Policy in a Carbon Affected and
Carbon Constrained Environment, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 3, 3–70 (2010).
6. See GERALD C. NELSON, ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE: IMPACT ON AGRICULTURE AND
COSTS OF ADAPTATION (2009).
7. Abrams & Hall, supra note 5. R
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II. THE BREADTH OF IOs
For IO nonmembers—such as cities and environmental agencies
or advocates—one and sometimes two layers of administration impinge
on opportunities to contract with irrigators receiving water via shared
delivery systems. The first layer is epitomized by the BOR, which is often
the legal owner of the agricultural water rights it manages and delivers
to irrigation districts.8 Other regional agencies (e.g., California State
Water Project) may serve a similar role in which the agency resembles a
wholesaler—typically providing water to retailer IOs.9 Even though the
BOR owns much of the irrigation water it handles, there are many situa-
tions where BOR-sponsored irrigation development did not result in fed-
eral water right ownership, providing clear evidence of the potential to
separate authority for facility operations from water right ownership
(e.g. Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District, Truckee-Carson Ir-
rigation District, and most Texas irrigation organizations).
The second layer of administrative restraint occurs at the retail
level, where local boards and organization managers oversee the collec-
tively managed facilities that convey water to farm gates. Direct owner-
ship of rights by many IOs subtracts additional water from that
transaction by irrigators. It is commonly argued that the IO’s power to
prevent or limit such transactions is justified by externalities—such as
reusable return flows—that link the collective’s irrigators.10 It is also ar-
gued that these externalities extend to the support of local agri-econo-
mies.11 The weight of these considerations warrants reexamination in
light of the rising burdens of protectionist policies.
Unfortunately, satisfactory documentation of the evolving role of
IOs was derailed after 1978 when the Census of Irrigation Organizations
(CIO) was terminated as part of the regular Census of Agriculture.12 The
8. See RICHARD W. WAHL, MARKETS FOR FEDERAL WATER: SUBSIDIES, PROPERTY RIGHTS,
AND THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION (1989).
9. DEP’T OF WATER RESOURCES, http://www.water.ca.gov/swp/contractors-contact.
cfm (last visited May 30, 2012) (The California State Water Project supplies water almost
exclusively to the 29 “contractors” that have long-term agreements with the Project.).
10. Kathleen A. Miller, The Right to Use Versus the Right to Sell: Spillover Effects and
Constraints on the Water Rights of Irrigation Organization Members, 23 WATER RESOURCES RES.
2166, 2166–73 (1987).
11. Kenneth R. Weber, Effects of Water Transfers on Rural Areas: A Response to Shupe,
Weatherford, and Checchio, 30 NAT. RESOURCES J. 13,13–15 (1990); see also Lawrence J.
MacDonnell & Charles W. Howe, Area-of-Origin Protection in Transbasin Water Diversions:
An Evaluation of Alternative Approaches, 57 U. OF COLO. L. REV. 527, 527–48 (1986).
12. See MARGOT ANDERSON, AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL INDICA-
TORS (1994), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/arei/ah705/ (last visited
Aug. 13, 2012).
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reallocative potential of IOs captured significant academic attention dur-
ing the 1980s’ surge of water marketing studies; however, interest seems
to have gone underground, perhaps due in part to deficient statistical
information regarding the overall command of water by IOs. Through
1978, the CIO had been conducted every decade since 1910.13 Among
other contributions, the CIO identified standardized IO types and re-
ported water deliveries and land service acreages according to these
types.14
The CIO taxonomy included nine classes of IOs: (1) Unincorporated
mutual—private “partnership or informal group of two or more farm-
ers;” (2) Incorporated mutual—private “legally constituted, cooperative-
type corporation;” (3) District—public entity with taxation and condem-
nation powers; (4) BOR constructed and operated; (5) BOR constructed and
user operated (and hence also an IO belonging to another grouping); (6)
Bureau of Indian Affairs operated—primarily on reservations; (7) State and
local governments—distinguished from districts in that districts are water-
focused organizations; (8) Commercial—not user controlled and usually
profit motivated (here, irrigation water service may be incidental to ac-
tivities such as electricity supply or municipal water supply); (9) Other.15
Proclivities to transfer water are uneven across these IO types, but
the taxonomy is not perfectly aligned with willingness to transfer. It is
well acknowledged that mutuals have historically been more receptive of
water transfers, by building upon unique traditions in which internal
transfers among shareholders were often permitted, especially via own-
ership shares in the mutual.16 The two BOR types are distinguished on
the basis of facility ownership rather than water ownership, so it is not
strictly accurate to say that one of these two classes offers a more condu-
cive platform for conducting water transfers. Still, user-owned facilities
may be correlated with user-owned water rights. IOs in the commercial
category might be regarded as more amenable to water transfers, be-
cause commercial operations can be profit oriented. However, commer-
cial IOs are few in number and their water supply activities are
sometimes secondary to other functions.
13. U.S. DEP’T OF COMM., IRRIGATION: 1978 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE 134 (1982).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 135–36.
16. Rodney T. Smith, Water Transfers, Irrigation Districts, and the Compensation Problem,
8 J. OF POL’Y ANALYSIS & MANG’T 446, 446–65 (1989).
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TABLE 1. Irrigation Organizations of the Western 17 States
1978 1950
Irrigated Acre- Irrigated
Acres feet Acres
IO Type Number (1000) (1000) Number (1000)
Unincorporated 3,557 2,031 6,669 6,417 2,114Mutual
Incorporated 2,431 6,979 33,424 2,880 5,636Mutual1
District1 831 10,770 58,385 483 4,962
BOR 86 251 48,699 37 682
BOR/User2 307 6,315 35,211 79 1,540
BIA 139 662 3,742 141 506
Commercial 55 220 6,068 131 705
Government 74 253 1,210 81 109
Other 17 202 9,150 0 0
All 7,190 21,340 167,152 10,170 14,714
Source: Tables 1-3 of the 1978 Census of Irrigation Organizations, U.S. Dept. of Commerce,
1982.
Footnotes
1Irrigated acreage and water use for Incorporated Mutuals and Districts may be slightly
overstated due to nondisclosure constraints for Louisiana which was previously
subtracted to obtain Western-only data.
2All data reported in the BOR-built/User-operated category is redundant with data also
incorporated for the seven nonBOR IOs. The sole purpose of this category is to more
completely represent the extent of BOR involvement in Western irrigation activity.
Using reassembled CIO data, Table 1 provides a snapshot of the
relative roles of different IO types as of the last survey. Of the 7,375 IOs
reported to be operating in the United States in 1978, 97.5 percent (7,190)
were in the 17-state Western United States, and 169 of the 185 nonwes-
tern IOs operated in Louisiana.17 The number of IOs peaked in the 1950
Census with 10,170 in the Western United States. The post-1950 decline
was dominated by falls in both mutual categories, which together de-
creased from 9,297 in 1950 to 5,988 in 1978. However, the 1950–1978
growth in irrigated acreage under mutuals suggests that small mutuals
were closing/combining during this period and much of the changes
were reorganizational.18
17. U.S. DEP’T OF COMM., supra note 13, at 146. R
18. U.S. DEP’T OF COMM., supra note 13, at 139. R
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Total irrigated acreage served by IOs increased from 14.7 million
acres in 1950 to 21.3 million acres in 1978. This was nearly one-half of the
Western United State’s total irrigated acreage (43.6 million acres), with
the remainder being self-supplied largely using ground water. The data
of Table 1 suggest that much of the 1950 to 1978 increase was the result
of BOR projects coming online, as BOR-sponsored acreage increased by
more than 4.3 million acres during this period. BOR acreage rose to over
30 percent of that served by IOs in 1978, while involving 50 percent of
the water.
Of the 167 million acre feet of water noted in Table 1, less than
two percent was directly withdrawn from a ground water source by the
reporting organization. 67 percent was directly withdrawn from a sur-
face water source, and 29 percent was provided by another IO.19 Setting
aside BOR water so as to focus on retail water deliveries, districts handle
more water and serve more acreage than any other IO type. Districts
deliver more than one-third of the water, and serve more than half of the
acreage, covered by western IOs. In light of their heightened flexibility
and potential advantage for transferring water, it is noteworthy that
mutuals of both forms handle a large portion of the West’s water.
It is important to recognize, however, that some of this data may
have changed substantially during the past 30 plus years, due to the ele-
vated malleability of mutuals as evidenced by the 1950 to 1978 trends. It
is also noteworthy that mutuals served more than nine million irrigated
acres in 1978 and delivered more than 40 million acre-feet of water. Even
though the role of mutuals may have moderated during recent decades,
these data suggest that mutuals may continue to be important forces.
III. WATER MARKETING ABSENT IOs
Population increases have been the primary driving factor for
water policy reform in the West and Southeast, but climate change is
now a noteworthy power. Climate change has several impacts on water
supply (e.g., precipitation quantity and reliability, snowpack quantity
and melt timing, flood risk effects on reservoir management opera-
tions)20 as well as its evolving influence on energy policy.
During recent decades, much has been said about the poor pros-
pects for supply-side solutions via additional water development due to
economic costs, environmental harms, and the physical scarcity of unap-
propriated water. In response, legal doctrines have been slowly evolving
19. U.S. DEP’T OF COMM., supra note 13, at 152. R
20. See KATHLEEN MILLER & DAVID YATES, CLIMATE CHANGE AND WATER RESOURCES: A
PRIMER FOR MUNICIPAL WATER PROVIDERS (2005).
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to facilitate the transferability of water rights and thereby mitigate scar-
city in advantageous ways. This is especially true in the more arid west-
ern states where a legal platform for trading is already established with
the severance of surface water rights from land.21 Calls for reduced re-
strictions upon water marketing22 have been answered throughout the
West,23 and further reforms are likely to happen. Some of these policy
revisions have been complex developments,24 yet rising scarcity has justi-
fied the advances.
A key attribute of water marketing as a policy instrument is its
reliance on voluntary action, thereby elevating chances that results are
actually win-win and achievable at low cost. Moreover, the decentralized
fashion in which these trades are resolved allows participants to accom-
modate the particularized attributes of their water demands. Because
water’s use value varies substantially across agents, even within sectoral
classifications, attention to individual conditions is an underappreciated
achievement that contributes to social welfare and the efficiency of water
use.
Another advantage of water marketing is that it provides an ave-
nue for environmental demands to be better met in spite of the historical
underallocation of water rights to in situ purposes. That is, because of the
strong historical tendency to grant rights only to appropriators, the envi-
ronment tended to become a residual claimant of water rights, possess-
ing only what was left over.25 One may protest the fairness of
environmental purchases in terms of who is paying and why sufficient
protections of environmental water were not built into water right grant-
ing processes many decades ago. However, at least transferability pro-
vides a tool for stewardship agencies and environmental groups to
rededicate water to the environment, especially during stressed periods
21. See ADAM SCHEMPP, WESTERN WATER IN THE 21ST CENTURY: POLICIES AND PROGRAMS
THAT STRETCH SUPPLIES IN A PRIOR APPROPRIATION WORLD (2009).
22. See J.W. Milliman, Water Law and Private Decision-Making: A Critique, 2 THE J. OF L.
& ECON. 41, 41–63 (1959); see also TERRY L. ANDERSON, WATER CRISIS: ENDING THE POLICY
DROUGHT (1983).
23. Gerald Johns, Where is California Taking Water Transfers?, 129 J. OF WATER RE-
SOURCES PLAN. & MGMT. 1, 1–3 (2003); Thomas C. Brown, Trends in Water Market Activity
and Price in the Western United States, 42 WATER RESOURCES RES. 1 (2006), available at http://
www.fs.fed.us/rm/value/docs/trends_in_water_market_activity.pdf.
24. Itay Fischhendler & David Zilberman, Packaging policies to reform the water sector:
The case of the Central Valley Project Improvement Act, 41 WATER RESOURCES RES. 1, 1–14
(2005).
25. Bonnie G. Colby, Enhancing Instream Flow Benefits in an Era of Water Marketing, 26
WATER RESOURCES RES. 1113, 1113–20 (1990); Ronald C. Griffin & Shih-Hsun Hsu, The Poten-
tial for Water Market Efficiency When Instream Flows Have Value, 75 AM. J. OF AGRIC. ECON.
292, 292–303 (1993).
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which give rise to low flows and high water temperatures, both of which
can be perilous for native species.26 A Californian inventory indicates
that environmental water leases in that state have grown to exceed the
volume of transacted water to any other sector with the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service being the major procurer.27
Important local and regional water markets now exist in much of
the West. Outside of the United States, policy changes have introduced
original water markets to other nations.28 Within the United States, va-
ried institutional settings have established unique variations of empow-
erment for water property owners, sometimes forging idiosyncratic
marketplaces and site-specific nomenclatures. Differing marketing con-
straints and administrative approval processes modify the latitudes for
trade and, consequently, the transaction costs of trade. Varying by locale,
transfers may occur in different forms, including transactions in perma-
nent rights, temporary leases of rights, and sometimes mere transactions
in water access rights. Such is the nature of decentralization. Some mar-
kets remain constrained in that leases are permitted but not sales.29
Across all of these developments, the increased scarcity of water
has fostered policy evolution. Yet, IOs are lagging participants in this
process. Consequently, the proportion of western irrigation rights held
by IOs must be rising, as are the pressures of scarcity upon these organi-
zations. IOs bring new challenges which have been incompletely ad-
dressed by the promarketing reforms of recent decades.
IV. WATER REALLOCATION IN THE PRESENCE OF IOs
The propensities and abilities of individual IOs to respond to in-
creasing water demand in nonagricultural sectors depend on several fac-
tors. First among these is whether growth-inspired water demand is
occurring interior to the legal boundaries of the IO. Second is whether
26. See PETE BISSON, SALMON AND TROUT IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST AND CLIMATE
CHANGE, (2008), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/ccrc/topics/salmon-trout.shtml (last
visited Aug. 13, 2012).
27. See ELLEN HANAK, WHO SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO SELL WATER IN CALIFORNIA?:
THIRD-PARTY ISSUES AND THE WATER MARKET (2003).
28. See K. WILLIAM EASTER, MARK W. ROSEGRANT & ARIEL DINAR, MARKETS FOR WATER:
POTENTIAL AND PERFORMANCE (1998); see also LIN CRASE, WATER POLICY IN AUSTRALIA: THE
IMPACT OF CHANGE AND UNCERTAINTY (2008), available at http://admin.cita-aragon.es/pub/
documentos/documentos_CRASE_2-5_b8e6f4de.pdf; Carl J. Bauer, Results of Chilean Water
Markets, 40 WATER RESOURCES RES. 1 (2004).
29. Janis M. Carey & David L. Sunding, Emerging Markets in Water: A Comparative Insti-
tutional Analysis of the Central Valley and Colorado-Big Thompson Projects, 41 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 283, 283–328 (2001) (The California market is largely limited to short term leases of
water.).
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the IO’s water rights, if it possesses any, are the transactable property of
members of the organization. Prospects for reallocation are improved
when reallocation is internal to the IO and/or members own water
rights. For external reallocation in cases where neither the IO nor its
members hold the pertinent water rights, as in the case of many IOs re-
ceiving contract water from the BOR, reallocation is rendered even more
difficult.
A. Internal Transfers
Lubricating influences can assist reallocation in instances of inter-
nal water marketing. These situations are unique—less problematic in
most ways, yet more so in others. Where urbanization is converting irri-
gated lands to new activities, IOs are less irrigation-centric about the
water under their control. District managers are known to facilitate
water availability in these cases, in the interest of community develop-
ment, organization preservation, and job security.30 Although IOs were
established to advance agricultural activities, internal trade retains water
for local economic development, thereby reducing the possibility of legal
challenges when water supplies are extended to nonagricultural sectors.
Still, several problems can arise when IOs favor internal realloca-
tion. For example, satisfaction of urban, domestic, and commercial water
demands can be achieved via internal reallocation, yet environmental
water demands tend to remain shut out because of their immobile and
normally external location. Consequently, environmental sponsors—
such as governmental fish and wildlife agencies or nongovernmental en-
vironmental organizations—may be forced to compete in smaller
(outside the IO) and more expensive water markets.
Another problem occurs when IOs exhibit biases favoring internal
over external reallocation. This tilts the land development playing field
by encouraging the conversion of internal irrigated properties. An out-
come can be the urbanization of more productive irrigated lands (inter-
nal) rather than external dry land. In addition, fragmentation of irrigated
lands within the IO’s service area can result, reducing the hydrologic
and economic efficiencies of surface water deliveries via canals. Per-acre
conveyance losses and canal maintenance costs are lower when irrigated
areas remain contiguous and compact.
Finally, sustained reallocation of both land and water away from
agriculture within a given IO sometimes produces tensions between the
30. GISSER & JOHNSTON, supra note 4. R
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IO and the local domestic/urban water supplier(s).31 Alternatively, the
IO can morph into a new role by expanding the amount of water
processing (e.g., treatment and piped conveyance) it performs for the
growing domestic/urban segment of its clients.32 New roles require con-
tinual reformulation of IO policies. For example, morphing organizations
typically apply an array of water rates (for different sectors), and it is
common for such rate systems to take on complex designs while argua-
bly embedding subsidies for a favored sector.
B. External Transfers
IO leadership teams are less receptive to reallocations of water to
buyers outside of their service regions. For this reason, external situa-
tions are emphasized in the remainder of this article. IO administrators,
managers, and boards of directors tend to see threats rather than oppor-
tunities in external reallocations. Thus, when they have authority over
transfer policy, they express reservations, underscore legal issues and
other difficulties, and suppress institutional change. For the most part,
the problems emphasized by these leaders are real issues, justifying our
attention, even where they may be overstated.
Prospects for external reallocation must often address the com-
bined challenges of organization-held water rights and linked rural econ-
omies, both of which stall reallocation even when reallocation may be
desirable to end water users—at both ends of any given transaction.
There are multiple, reinforcing marketing hurdles in these situations.
A first hurdle occurs when the water-using clients of an IO hold
water rights collectively, not individually, giving rise to an original type
of common property issue in which common ownership encourages re-
source misuse. For typical district-like IOs, water right ownership is said
31. A recent case involves the City of McAllen, Texas, and Hidalgo County Water
Improvement District 3. Organized to provide irrigation water in 1921, urbanization of the
district now places the city as the district’s majority customer, with the district arguably
becoming more superfluous. Dave Hendricks, Next step uncertain in McAllen’s water war,
THE MONITOR (McAllen, Tex.), July 2, 2011, available at http://www.themonitor.com/arti-
cles/mcallen-52409-water-step.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2012). The city successfully got a
bill before the 2011 Texas Legislature to allow local voters to dissolve the district, and the
bill overwhelmingly passed in both House and Senate. TEXAS LEGISLATURE ONLINE, http://
www.capitol.state.tx.us/BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=82R&Bill=SB978 (last visited
June 15, 2012) (Governor Perry vetoed the bill on grounds that the local vote would give
unfair advantage to the city.).
32. Such organizations may continue to be named irrigation districts even when the
irrigation purpose becomes minor. For example, Vista Irrigation District in southern Cali-
fornia delivers only 6 percent of its water to agriculture. History, VISTA IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
http://www.vid-h2o.org/aboutus/ourhistory.asp (last visited June 9, 2012).
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to be “diffused” in that an organization’s water rights are jointly owned
by all clients of the IO, and some measure of ownership may extend,
implicitly or even explicitly, to other local interests such as agribusi-
nesses and the general community.33 Stated in a way that underscores
the economic losses consequent to diffused ownership, there is a “trag-
edy of the anticommons” present when traders of water use rights can
have their planned transfers blocked by other parties.34 Even where legal
prohibitions on trade are absent, there is a strong reluctance on the part
of district boards and managers to approve of out-of-district transfers.35
Where their concerns are arguably well founded,36 it may be possible to
design contract modifications involving compensation or mitigation of
local effects.37
Second, in the case of external transfers, any reapportionment of
irrigation water takes on attributes of an “area of origin” with the addi-
tional concerns that accompany this matter.38 Here, local water “nonus-
ers” contend that continuing irrigation to its fullest extent is desirable to
support the agriculturally linked interests of a region. IO leaders tend to
be supportive of this position when external transfers are proposed, just
as these leaders repeat any argument favoring the status quo retention of
water rights.
This “district of origin” problem constitutes a mere pecuniary ex-
ternality—one that is transmitted because of a functioning market, and
therefore it is not a bona fide market failure (implying that economic
efficiency is not upset). This is completely different from technological
externalities such as pollution and return flow interdependencies. Yet,
there is a normative disruption in the axioms of economics that muddies
considerations of area-of-origin protections, and it is observable that pol-
icies protecting areas of origin foul but one of the two available visions of
economic efficiency.39 Given the political sensitivities that arise when
33. See BRENT M. HADDAD, RIVERS OF GOLD: DESIGNING MARKETS TO ALLOCATE WATER
IN CALIFORNIA (2000).
34. Stephen N. Bretsen & Peter J. Hill, Water Markets as a Tragedy of the Anticommons, 33
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 723, 723–83 (2009).
35. Susanna Eden et al., Agricultural Water to Municipal Use: The Legal and Institutional
Context for Voluntary Transactions in Arizona, 58 THE WATER REP. 9, 9–20 (2008).
36. Miller, supra note 10. R
37. GISSER & JOHNSTON, supra note 4; see also SMITH, supra note 4; Eden, supra note 35. R
38. See RONALD C. GRIFFIN, WATER RESOURCE ECONOMICS: THE ANALYSIS OF SCARCITY,
POLICIES, AND PROJECTS (2006); see also NAT. RES. COUN., supra note 4. R
39. GRIFFIN, supra note 38, at ch. 2, 7 (Under the two available efficiency objectives R
promulgated by economic doctrines, Pareto optimality and net benefits maximization, pro-
tecting areas of origin is admissible under the Pareto criterion, but not the stronger crite-
rion. Net benefits maximization does not respect negative secondary economic effects in
areas of origin because of the offsetting positive secondary economic effects to be exper-
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water policy portends an economic activity decline for agriculturally de-
pendent locales, it may be crucial to prepare contingencies to address,
and possibly assuage, objections along these lines. Whereas economic
theory can be reasoned to be dismissive of pecuniary externalities be-
cause such externalities are artifacts of markets performing social good
rather than bad, political sensitivities tend to be different.40
Within this problematic setting, institutional change may be a re-
quired precursor for effective reallocation via water markets. It is feasible
that such change will have to be innovative and even dramatic. Yet, if
new approaches are not well conceived, it is possible that the costs of
change will overwhelm the prospective gains.
Overall, the stakes are high in that it may be practical to achieve a
lot of public good if pressures upon the West’s water resource base can
be released through improved participation in reallocation by IOs.
VI. A PREMARKETING DESIGN MEETS A NEW ERA
U.S. IOs were created because infrastructure to deliver water to
farmland was in demand, economically and politically.41 The early irriga-
tion organizations of the 1800s were privately organized cooperatives,
often in support of land development schemes.42 During the latter 1800s
many western states applied novel legislation to initiate and support the
formation of public IOs with powers usually reserved for local govern-
ienced in the area of water receipt. As a strictly aggregative measure, total net benefits
maximization does not weight any one sector (e.g. agribusiness) more highly than others,
so status quo protections for existing beneficiaries are not supported for businesses which
are economically linked to water users. On the other hand, because of the variable fairness
perspectives accommodated by Pareto optimality, it is “neutral” in deciding whether areas
of origin merit special protections that might restrict water export). Thus, many, indeed
infinitely many, efficient states of the economy can be envisioned according to Pareto op-
timality, and the Pareto criterion is indifferent across these. Among Pareto optimal states of
the economy are states where irrigation-linked businesses and their local economies enjoy a
protected status. Thus, prohibitions of water export from districts of origin cannot be criti-
cized on Pareto grounds even though such restrictions inhibit the total value that a basin
gains from its natural water supply. Viewed another way, the Pareto criterion is somewhat
anemic in its ability to compare with, and without, policy scenarios, whereas net benefits
maximization is a sharper and more insistent objective. Still, the choice between the two
efficiency criteria is normative.
40. Randall G. Holcombe & Russell S. Sobel, Public Policy Toward Pecuniary Externali-
ties, 29 PUB. FIN. REV. 304, 304–25 (2001).
41. See Ronald C. Griffin, The Origins and Ideals of Water Resource Economics in the U.S.,
4 ANN. REV. OF RESOURCE ECON. (forthcoming 2012).
42. Katharine Coman, Some Unsettled Problems of Irrigation, 1 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 1–19
(1911); see also Arthur Maass & Raymond Anderson, . . . AND THE DESERT SHALL REJOICE:
CONFLICT, GROWTH, AND JUSTICE IN ARID ENVIRONMENTS (1978).
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ments.43 Further encouragement came with the powerful U.S. Reclama-
tion Act of 190244 (Reclamation Act) which provided technical assistance
and substantial subsidies for establishing irrigation infrastructure.45
Currently, most U.S. irrigation organizations are at least several
decades old. They were established when naturally occurring water was
too plentiful to have marginal value46 in its found location. Natural water
was typically free for this reason; permits were granted for the trouble of
applying for them. Permit approval hinged on beneficial use require-
ments, which meant that users had to install infrastructure to activate
and secure their permit quantities. Therefore, infrastructural capacity es-
tablished maximum water permit quantities, but infrastructure meant
costs; naturally occurring water did not involve costs. Even in contempo-
rary contractual relations between IOs and agency water wholesalers,
such as the BOR and the California State Water Project, IOs are only re-
sponsible for processing costs,47 experiencing no costs representing the
embedded value of natural water. Under these circumstances, many irri-
gators do not receive a sufficient economic signal in the form of a rate or
a market price that would motivate production activities that are fully
respectful of resource values. Rates are founded on infrastructure and
operational costs, not water value.
What was strongly valued at the time of each IO’s creation was
the ability to deliver water to arable lands. What was scarce was infra-
structure, which is a form of capital. Most IOs were designed as non-
profit ventures to sponsor construction of this capital, primarily
pumping plants, canals, and often storage impoundments. IOs such as
mutuals and commercial entities had to arrange their own financing,
43. Orson Winso Israelsen, A Discussion of the Irrigation District Movement (May
1914) (unpublished M.S. Thesis, University of California Berkeley) available at http://
archive.org/details/discussionofirri00israrich (last visited Aug. 13, 2012); see also Coman,
supra note 42. R
44. Reclamation Act, Pub. L. No. 57-161, 32 Stat. 388 (1902) (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. §§ 371-660e 2006)).
45. The most important subsidies are instances of omissions in the Act of particular
costs, so it is not satisfactory to identify them in the original Act or its many revisions.
Richard W. Wahl, Water Marketing and the Bureau of Reclamation, 79 WATER RESOURCES UP-
DATE 12, 12–15 (1989); see also Griffin, supra note 41. R
46. Marginal value, the value of an additional unit at current use levels, is a key point
of emphasis for examining the prospective efficiency of alternative policy and for maximiz-
ing the net benefits, inclusive of all water uses, that a society obtains from its water
endowments.
47. Processing costs are primarily operation and maintenance costs, but some repay-
ment and debt costs associated with infrastructure may also be included. Forgiveness of
interest costs has historically been the prime source of subsidy in Reclamation policy
whereas the California program assigned its interest costs to contracting water districts.
WAHL, supra note 8. R
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often relying on strictly internal energies or funds. Legislatures granted
many IOs the power to issue bonds,48 and they took on the indebtedness
and other duties necessary to get this capital in place. These organiza-
tions—at least the ones that survived—developed into effective agencies
for managing this capital and collecting money from members and prop-
erty owners to defray repayment, operation, and maintenance costs.
Whereas both inputs, natural water and infrastructure, are formally es-
sential49 in the production of irrigation water, IOs were designed to
tackle the infrastructural challenges, given the ready availability of natu-
ral water at the time of their birth and for many years thereafter.
One hundred years after the Reclamation Act, the relative scarci-
ties of capital and water have changed. The water marketing evidence is
widespread, not only in private transactions but occasionally in deals in-
volving irrigation organizations. In the rare jurisdictions where whole
IOs can be bought and sold, they are sometimes purchased for their
water right holdings, with the value of their capital taking an obvious
backseat.50 In places where urbanization is eliminating the traditional
tasks of IOs, IOs are attempting to transform into new rolls, but conflicts
between the IO and urban government can arise, leaving people to won-
der why the IO has not been retired.51 Where IOs allow transfers between
nonagricultural entities and irrigators owning entitlement shares, the
nonagricultural buyers are most interested in obtaining the water
(though they also receive storage and delivery services in cases where
the buyer is physically linked to the IO). Where IO management is con-
ducting water trades with external urban interests, it is the organiza-
tion’s water right holdings that are motivating the transactions. Now
that water is highly appropriated in the West, these activities indicate
that heightened IO participation is a desired part of the solution package
for rising scarcity.
The Western United States is now well into an era when the esca-
lating problem of scarce water management is facing off with organiza-
48. See Stephen N. Bretsen & Peter J. Hill, Irrigation Institutions in the American West, 25
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 283, 283–331 (2006).
49. By definition, an essential input is one for which a zero level of employment im-
plies a zero level of output.
50. Texas is the lead example for these possibilities. Most notably, the Lower Colorado
River Authority (a large quasipublic electricity and water supplier in Texas) has actively
expanded its water sales capacity by purchasing irrigation companies. These include multi-
ple purchases over several decades and IOs serving tens of thousands of irrigated acres. To
date the Authority has continued to serve this acreage, but rising rates and a new regime of
providing irrigation water on an “interruptible” basis has resulted in greater security for
urban water supply activities. RONALD C. GRIFFIN, WATER POLICY IN TEXAS: RESPONDING TO
THE RISE OF SCARCITY 49–77 (2011).
51. Hendricks, supra note 31. R
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMN\52-2\NMN206.txt unknown Seq: 15  8-NOV-12 8:40
Fall 2012] ENGAGING IRRIGATION ORGANIZATIONS 291
tions originally designed for capital management. In some cases,
fortuitous conditions have allowed this to work out well, such as in the
Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District where irrigators ended
up owning shares of their IO’s water, because of repayment responsibili-
ties in a region where some existing irrigators already had water sup-
plies and did not wish to participate at the time of project creation.52 That
is, preexisting irrigators did not wish to be financially responsible for
project repayment requirements (in spite of large subsidies), so political
and contractual agreements necessary for project approval and construc-
tion were obstructed.53 To overcome this hurdle, it was decided that only
project beneficiaries would pay, and this was accomplished by creating
shares in the new water supply.54 Shareholders had to pay annual assess-
ments to the district, and these shares became transferable entitlements
to the water supply.55
Where IOs were formed as mutuals, with individual farmers own-
ing preset portions of the organization’s water rights, there are improved
options for achieving efficient allocation. This achievement stems from a
more concentrated ownership of water rights, yet mutuals are a less
common form of irrigation organization in most states (e.g., Arizona)
and tend to be smaller.
When it comes to optimal water management, most IOs are ham-
strung by their policies. Rules allowing trade between member-irrigators
and external sectors are commonly absent because IOs were not de-
signed for transfers,56 internal policy prohibitions are sometimes explicit,
and change is usually opposed for many years after it is initially pro-
posed.57 These rules have created decision-making processes that pro-
hibit maximization of water’s value for the irrigators that IOs were
originally intended to serve. Irrigators are not the only potentially
harmed parties in circumstances where IOs tightly hold the water rights.
A further consequence is that growing urban areas must ration water
more carefully or seek out other water sources, often at great expense.
Moreover, these urban pursuits place further stress on already pressured
environmental water. When environmental organizations and agencies
52. Charles W. Howe, Dennis R. Schurmeier & W. Douglass Shaw, Jr., Innovative Ap-
proaches to Water Allocation: The Potential for Water Markets, 22 WATER RESOURCES RES. 439,
439–45 (1986); see also Janis M. Carey & David L. Sunding, Emerging Markets in Water: A
Comparative Institutional Analysis of the Central Valley and Colorado-Big Thompson Projects, 41
NAT. RESOURCES J. 283, 283–328 (2001).
53. Howe, Schurmeier & Shaw, supra note 52. R
54. Howe, Schurmeir & Shaw, supra note 52. R
55. Bretsen & Hill, supra note 34. R
56. Bretsen & Hill, supra note 34. R
57. GISSER & JOHNSTON, supra note 4, at 137–65. R
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are denied the ability to buy or lease organization-held rights, their op-
tions can be quite limited, and litigation can become a favored path. Con-
sequently, IO limitations on water transfers have had negative
ramifications in multiple ways.
VII. THE BOR: A UNIQUE INSTITUTION
As an entrenched, ubiquitous, and powerful water agency, the
BOR is the elephant in the room when it comes to western water reallo-
cation. Its policies are demonstrably resistant to change, and for this rea-
son there is a great deal of prospective labor to be honestly weighed by
reformers. The high level of subsidy brought to western states by the
BOR has established strong political alliances on key levels.58 IOs benefit-
ing from BOR’s efforts tend to be content with their long-term contrac-
tual relationships. IO leaders prefer stabilization of existing policy in the
same way that BOR administrators do. Irrigators receiving BOR-handled
water are aware of the low prices and, typically, their lack of strict water
right ownership. Intuitive risk-reward assessments by any of these par-
ties makes it difficult for reform efforts to garner internal support. Based
on the record, water scarcity needs to reach critical levels before old rules
can be modified.
Wahl argues that the institutionalized reluctance of the BOR to
allow trade is a matter of the BOR’s customary practices rather than legal
prohibitions.59 Yet, it remains true that trade in BOR-managed water has
greater feasibility when the BOR is not the owner of water rights. Wahl’s
1989 tabulation shows considerable differences across states and projects
in terms of who owns the water storage rights within BOR projects,
thereby providing some indication of reallocative potentials.60 In Califor-
nia and Utah, 94–97 percent of storage rights were U.S.-owned, yet it is
also true that the overall BOR presence is greater in California than
Utah.61 In Arizona and New Mexico, 65 percent were U.S.-owned within
each state.62 Yet, only 25 percent were U.S.-owned in Colorado.63 These
numbers are changing in some regions as IOs complete their repayment
obligations to the United States under the Reclamation Act and possibly
58. WAHL, supra note 8; Randall R. Rucker & Price V. Fishback, The Federal Reclamation R
Program: An Analysis of Rent-Seeking Behavior, in WATER RIGHTS: SCARCE RESOURCE ALLOCA-
TION, BUREAUCRACY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 45–81 (Terry L. Anderson ed., 1983); Jon R.
Miller, The Political Economy of Western Water Finance: Cost Allocation and the Bonneville Unit
of the Central Utah Project, 69 AM. J. OF AGRIC. ECON. 303, 309–10 (1987).
59. WAHL, supra note 8. R
60. WAHL, supra note 8, at 174. R
61. WAHL, supra note 8. R
62. WAHL, supra note 8. R
63. WAHL, supra note 8. R
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gain more complete title to BOR-held rights. Whether these rights con-
vey to the IOs or to their irrigating members then becomes an important
question.
In some places, work to rectify the inflexible assignments of BOR
water has already been accomplished. Some measure of transferability
may exist in these locations. The Central Valley Project Improvement Act
of 199264 established a limited degree of transferability among the Cali-
fornian agricultural districts receiving water within this large BOR pro-
ject.65 Also, the BOR is a party to the onerously forged transfer
arrangement between the Imperial Irrigation District and urban buyers
in southern California.66 Elsewhere, there are several basins or districts
where the BOR has sanctioned unique transfers or where long histories
of leasing or even sales have been feasible.67 These are platforms that can
be extended within the IOs where they are occurring, as well as to other
BOR-served IOs where transfers have been barred.
While BOR policy has only weakly responded to criticisms about
underpricing and excess irrigation, there are changes to be observed.
Conservation plans are now required of most IOs receiving water from
the BOR.68 The BOR will not approve or reject submitted plans, but it will
offer suggestions.69 A specific guidance manual has been generated to
assist in the preparation of these plans.70 Whereas incentivizing rate
structures such as block rates are observed as possible strategies in this
document,71 in actual practice two blocks are customary with the first
block being sufficiently wide to encompass the majority of farm set-
tings.72 Thus, on-the-ground inducements to alter water use practices re-
main modest, and the pricing problems of subsidized delivery and
64. Central Valley Project Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 3401-3412, 106 Stat
4600 (1992).
65. Richard Howitt & Dave Sunding, Water Infrastructure and Water Allocation in Cali-
fornia, in CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURE: DIMENSIONS AND ISSUES 181, 182 (Jerry Siebert ed., 2004),
available at http://giannini.ucop.edu/CalAgBook/Chap7.pdf.
66. Id. at 183–84.
67. WAHL, supra note 8. R
68. DEP’T. OF THE INT., PEC-10-22, RECLAMATION MANUAL: DIRECTIVES AND STANDARDS
(2006), available at http://www.usbr.gov/recman/pec/pec10-22.pdf.
69. DEP’T. OF THE INT., WTR 01-01, RECLAMATION MANUAL: DIRECTIVES AND STANDARDS
(2003), available at http://www.usbr.gov/recman/wtr/wtr01-01.pdf.
70. HYDROSPHERE RES. CONSULTANTS & U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ACHIEVING EFFI-
CIENT WATER MANAGEMENT: A GUIDEBOOK FOR PREPARING AGRICULTURAL WATER MANAGE-
MENT PLANS (2d ed. 2000) available at http://www.usbr.gov/waterconservation/docs/
Guidemstr.pdf.
71. Id. at 68–70.
72. Ari M. Michelsen et al., Emerging Agricultural Water Conservation Price Incentives, 24
J. OF AGRIC. AND RESOURCE ECON. 222, 232 (1999).
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omitted water value continue. Transfers are also an observed strategy
within the guidance document,73 yet emphasis is upon in-district reallo-
cations. Overall, these conservation promotions constitute incremental
policy shifts.
Although it has been argued that the BOR is a required partici-
pant for future Western transfers74 and that many BOR policies constitute
barriers for achieving efficiency, some groundwork now exists for con-
ducting reallocation in specific districts, as noted above. Outside of these
areas, new efforts to foster reallocation with the BOR will require pa-
tience. In large basins it may be practical to “work around” the BOR,
perhaps by pursuing trades with more flexible IOs, especially those
which are not fully dependent on BOR water supplies. Perhaps the an-
nual rate of transfers, as fueled by population growth, will not be so
momentous that large reallocations are justified in any single year, mak-
ing such strategies more practical.
VIII. OWNERSHIP AND RULES
Setting aside wholesalers such as the BOR, for all types of retailing
IOs, system-level capital is communally owned, and for the majority of
these IOs water rights are also communally owned. It is the communal
ownership of water that is obstructing, with nonagricultural demand
groups commonly experiencing greater marginal water values than is be-
ing received for the lowest valued irrigation uses, due to the absence of
trading. When marginal values are not equalized, society is not maximiz-
ing the rewards received from its water.75 Economically, water is being
wasted.
In Table 2, the notion that marketing tools for improved manage-
ment hinge on ownership institutions is underscored. When the organi-
zational type is an ordinary “District,” property rights to water and
control over water are held at the district level. In this case control over
water is diffused across all water users (and possibly the greater commu-
nity as well), and a political process involving elected board members
73. HYDROSPHERE RES. CONSULTANTS & U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, supra note 70, at R
76–77.
74. MARCA WEINBERG, CONGR. BUDGET OFFICE, WATER USE CONFLICTS IN THE WEST: IM-
PLICATIONS OF REFORMING THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION’S WATER SUPPLY POLICIES 2 (Sherry
Snyder et al. eds., 1997) available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftp
docs/0xx/doc46/wateruse.pdf.
75. See GRIFFIN, supra note 38, 42–44, 216–20, 366–68 (There are well acknowledged R
considerations that require adjustments to the equal marginal value rule in the case of
water, but these are regarded as implicitly understood and manageable here. Examples
include transportation costs such as conveyance losses incurred in moving district water to
distant cities, as well as return flow disparities and instream flow contributions.).
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and board interaction with a hired manager is used to select policy.
Water allocation is then influenced by multiple policies, including the
rates established by the board, and is largely managed via nonmarket
policies.76
TABLE 2. District Management Options Mirror Ownership
Organization Type:
Water Control:
Allocation Style:
Districts
Diffused
(common property)
Nonmarket
Mutuals
Range of Realizations
Concentrated
(private property)
Market
Although we must recognize that there is a spectrum of organiza-
tion models in place, leading one writer to liken water districts to snow-
flakes,77 the co-op-resembling districts can be juxtaposed to the more
corporately styled “Mutual” (or “ditch company”) in which members
own distinct shares. Mutuals are not attempting to generate a profit—
that is for the share owners to accomplish on their farms—yet mutuals
are often permissive about the exchange of shares among members.78
Mutuals may even allow transfers to outside parties, usually requiring
that new owners accept the fiscal responsibilities that accompany share-
holdings. It is no coincidence that the Northern Colorado Water Conser-
vancy District, which is arguably the United States’ strongest example of
an urban-enabling IO (and which is a BOR project), utilizes mutual-like
water right shares that are actually possessed by water users, and this
district handles most of the irrigation-to-urban transfers conducted in
76. Rates set by districts in these cases should not be mistaken as a market activity.
77. John D. Leshy, Special Water Districts—The Historical Background, in SPECIAL WATER
DISTRICTS: CHALLENGE FOR THE FUTURE 11, 23 (James N. Corbridge, Jr. ed., 1983).
78. See Rodney T. Smith, The Economic Determinants and Consequences of Private and
Public Ownership of Local Irrigation Facilities, in WATER RIGHTS: SCARCE RESOURCE ALLOCA-
TION, BUREAUCRACY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 167–217 (T. L. Anderson, 1983).
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Colorado.79 In Utah, mutuals are the dominant owners of irrigation
water rights.80
Western states have a variety of classifications of IOs, so the dis-
tinctions are more complex than what is presented in Table 2. Still, it is
readily witnessed that the strongest impediment to external purchase or
lease of IO rights is the common property ownership of water rights in
ordinary districts. The established “common” is centrally composed of
the entire water-consuming membership of a district. Moreover, where
districts have funded a portion of their capital or operations using reve-
nues other than user fees, such as property taxes, the common may ex-
tend to all property owners within district boundaries. Authorizing
legislation for individual districts may also include mandates emphasiz-
ing irrigation functions. In extreme cases, such as California’s Imperial
Irrigation District, the general citizenry may be de facto members of the
common due to the voting rules used to select board members and the
broad-based revenue sources long exercised by the district. When the
common is large and diverse in its membership, the inertia associated
with district-held water rights is correspondingly large.
IX. ARGUMENTS FAVORING STATUS QUO ARRANGEMENTS
All policies (rules, institutions) are two-sided. One side expresses
the duties of some group to behave in a particular manner toward others.
Simultaneously, the complementary side observes the privileges of the
latter group to expect certain behavior from others.81 Relaxing transfer
restrictions pertaining to district water increases irrigator privileges in
water management, which must be reflected by increased duties or lost
privileges for other parties. That is, we are contemplating reassignment
of the transferability “stick” from the IO’s bundle of legal entitlements to
the bundles of its members. It must be asked if there are private and
social interests served by present restrictions on the transferability of dis-
trict water and whether continuation of these protections has merit rela-
tive to the water use inefficiency that they perpetuate.
79. Memorandum from Suzanne Lieberman to Jennifer Pitt, Envtl. Def. Fund, Water
Organizations in Colorado: A First Look Into Control of Agricultural Water Rights by
Water Organizations and their Transfer Potential in the Colorado River Basin in Colorado
12 (2010) (on file with author).
80. Memorandum from Johanna Hamburger to Jennifer Pitt, Envtl. Def. Fund, Water
Organizations and Legal Framework of Water Rights in Utah 29 (2010) (on file with
author).
81. See DANIEL W. BROMLEY, ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND INSTITUTIONS: THE CONCEPTUAL
FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY (1989).
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The more prominent effects of enhancing district water transfera-
bility have to do with impacts on agriculture. Transfers of water from
agriculture are likely to reduce food production and increase crop prices,
albeit slightly during individual periods. It is expected that these
changes will concentrate where water has a low “value of marginal prod-
uct,” meaning that units of transferred water contribute little production
or the crop type itself is low valued. For example, likely first-choice
sources of transacted water would come at the expense of irrigated hay
or pasture acreages and on-farm delivery losses. Higher valued crops
such as vegetable, fruit, nursery, and wine grapes are unlikely to be
affected.
Even slight reductions in agricultural production may inspire
complaints from agri-centric interests for multiple reasons:
1. As a consequence of curtailed production, relatively immobile
(either physically or economically) agribusinesses can experience losses,
at least in the short run. This includes tenant farmers engaged in either
cash rent or sharecropping arrangements with landowners. All agribusi-
ness agents may be well acclimated to a regulatory setting where water
transferability is restricted, and it is difficult for them to visualize per-
sonal gains in relaxations of this regulation. Water export can lead to
unemployment for some currently working people. It is conceivable that
some of the capital established by these agents could become stranded
by reduced crop production and lose its value in advance of full depreci-
ation.82 For example, a custom harvester who provides a grain harvesting
service could experience decreased work and an inability to keep all
owned machinery occupied. Understandable worries over these matters
lead these types of agents to object strongly to heightened transferability.
Whether the strength of the objections is aligned well with the magni-
tude of prospective losses is an unanswered question until empirical
studies are performed on this question. Also, whether these types of
losses could be ameliorated sufficiently by phasing in new policies over
several years is unknown as well. It is crucial to realize that people who
will acquire new work, or new gains, as a consequence of the money
flowing into the area of origin are not in a position to anticipate their
gains and offer countervailing political support favoring transfers. The
same is true of economic development in the “area of water receipt.”
2. There may be some loss in the resiliency of food production as
a consequence of reduced irrigation. Excess food production capacity,
oftentimes supported by having a class of water rights confined to irriga-
tion by law or IO policy, provides a measure of insurance against uncer-
tain events affecting either the supply or demand for food. This
82. Carey & Sunding, supra note 52, at 284–328. R
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argument may sensibly support paying an “insurance premium” in the
form of inefficient water use, however there is still a balance to be struck,
warranting a cost-effective achievement of the goal. Because the preser-
vation of food production capacity is largely a nonlocal issue, social val-
ues are broadly felt. Consequently, this resiliency value may be better
sponsored at higher government levels. A more important efficiency
consideration may be that the objective to maintain excess food produc-
tion will be achieved more cost-effectively by directly targeting food out-
put rather than addressing one of many production inputs (i.e., water).
Because water’s influence on crop production is nonlinear and
nonuniform, food policy will have a comparative advantage over water
policy in achieving self-sufficiency or improving the resiliency of food
production.
3. County sales tax revenues may decline, affecting local govern-
ment, when a region serves purely as an area-of-origin for water rights.
If buyers of water lie in another region, the region containing the IO may
experience a reduction in total economic output upon which the sales tax
is based. Furthermore, advanced decoupling of water rights from land—
as may be necessary to activate water marketing—will lower land values
while creating water right value. Subsequently, the summed value of
separated land and water property is expected to exceed prior land (with
water access) value. If governments apply a property tax upon land val-
ues while exempting water right values from similar taxation, a decrease
in property tax collections should be anticipated. On the other hand,
when areas-of-water-origin are exchanging water for money, they will
become areas-of-money-receipt unless the sellers of water live outside
the region or are transferring their new money completely out of the
region. Some studies have indicated how these give-and-take matters
have balanced out for recent bodies of water transactions.83
4. Empowering irrigators with water right transferability reduces
the economic and political power held at the IO management level.
Water managers and boards have a harder time seeing gains when con-
trol over water is progressively granted to others, first to irrigating pro-
ducers and subsequently to outside water users via marketing. Thus,
leaders tend to be less enthusiastic about new water marketing arrange-
ments than the average irrigator. This is especially true of IO managers,
because they view all irrigation as key to job security.
83. See, e.g., UNIV. OF CAL. AGRIC. ISSUES CTR., SHARING SCARCITY: GAINERS AND LOSERS
IN WATER MARKETING (Harold O. Carter et al. eds., 1994), available at http://aic.ucdavis.
edu/publications/oldanrpubs/scarcity.pdf; LLOYD S. DIXON ET AL., RAND CORP., CALIFOR-
NIA’S 1991 DROUGHT WATER BANK: ECONOMIC IMPACTS IN THE SELLING REGIONS (1993), avail-
able at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2006/MR301.pdf.
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X. EFFICIENCY WITH FOOD AND WATER
Market-advancing water policy aims to improve allocative effi-
ciency, yet not at the cost of inefficiency in the provision of other com-
modities. Continued efficiency in food production is a notable goal in
any attempt to improve water policy. The IOs of the Western United
States support the production of very significant quantities of food, infer-
ring a high degree of public interest. Fortunately, food and related agri-
cultural products—including inputs—tend to be exchanged in highly
competitive markets where price signals induce all kinds of socially sig-
nificant activity.
At field-level irrigation contexts, well known theoretical princi-
ples indicate that efficient water use occurs where marginal costs are bal-
anced against changes in gains.84 It has been long acknowledged that
water transferability among irrigators enhances agricultural output.85
More broadly, in terms of the array of water-influencing decisions faced
on the farm, it is true that the conjunctive selection of crops, irrigation
technologies, land leveling, and other inputs foster the pursuit of profit.
All of these choices, except the use of water, are framed in market set-
tings where the level of competition is strong and markets are thought to
be performing well. If external or internal IO water policies are modified
to improve water marketing, relatively efficient adjustments should be
anticipated from the host of related agricultural markets. That is, the effi-
ciencies with which these other markets operate generate confidence
about the outcomes.
XI. REFORM OBJECTIVES
A useful thought process for investigating reform options begins
with an imaginative exercise. If IOs in their current format were hypo-
thetically eliminated and a clean institutional slate was established, with
their current water supply holdings and infrastructural development in-
tact, what would be an optimal design for contemporary IOs? Although
a clean slate is politically unrealistic in the near term, it is a clarifying
position from which to conceive reformation opportunities. Given that
current institutions embodied in irrigation organizations were designed
long ago, they may be unsuited to contemporary demands.
84. See E.O. HEADY & J. L. DILLON, AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS (1961); see
also ROGER W. HEXEM & EARL O. HEADY, WATER PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS FOR IRRIGATED
AGRICULTURE (1987).
85. RAY PALMER TEELE, THE ECONOMICS OF LAND RECLAMATION IN THE UNITED STATES
228 (1927).
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There are two functions for a redesigned IO to perform, and ar-
ranging for their joint accomplishment is important. The two are the de-
livery of water and the allocation of water. These are not independent
matters from the IO’s perspective, though it is primarily allocation that
interests contemporary public policy due to rising water scarcity. Effec-
tive performance of each function is important. The allocation of focus in
this article occurs where IOs interface with the urban and environment
sectors. However, it is also important that internally used water generate
a high level of profitability across farmers.
Acknowledging both delivery and allocation functions, what
achievements are desired of freshly designed IOs?
1. Within the IO:
(A) The IO should be fiscally sound in generating revenue suffi-
cient to offset all ordinary operational and maintenance costs including
all appropriate planning and administrative functions. (B) Facilities
should be in an economic state of repair with any unaddressed mainte-
nance or projects not (yet) justified economically. (C) Irrigator clients of
the IO should be making production and water conservation decisions
that approximately exhaust their opportunities to profit. Among many
other things these decisions include matters of crop selection, fallowing,
technology choices, and water application.
2. Outside the IO, yet influenced by the IO:
(D) A balance should be achieved among urban, agricultural, and
environmental water values at the margin. From an aggregative social
perspective, it is unsatisfactory to have urban interests spending 3x dol-
lars per unit of added water supply when marginal irrigation value is x.86
(E) Efficient levels of housing and commercial growth are being sup-
ported. Economically advantageous growth is occurring and is receiving
the water supply it merits. Economically inefficient levels of growth are
not being supported.
Although this listing is abbreviated, it includes unmet challenges.
Currently, it is unlikely that objectives (C) to (E) are being satisfied
within the boundaries of water-scarce regions containing IOs. Not all ir-
rigators are achieving their profit potentials, because they are being de-
nied opportunities to conserve water in return for money.
Nonagricultural growth is not being well managed due to deficient op-
86. See Carey & Sunding, supra note 52, at 287 (In summarizing findings of prior stud- R
ies, Carey and Sunding observe that due to restrictive transfer institutions in California
“[t]he marginal value of water in municipal and industrial uses is typically three to four
times greater than the marginal value in agriculture.”).
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portunities to obtain water inexpensively. Environmental water is
weakly procurable even when it might have a sufficiently high value to
justify the exchange of water. These challenges may help spark the type
of reform options that should be implemented.
XII. REFORM OPTIONS
To gain an open-minded vision of the changing role of IOs, recog-
nizing the long-term reciprocal relationship that exists between institu-
tions and resource value is helpful. Institutions—the rules of human
interaction—impact value importantly. This is quite evident in water set-
tings. For example, when a majority of a basin’s water is employed by a
single sector and rules prohibit changes in this arrangement, then
water’s marginal value to the agents using it is lowered. The consequent
subsidy for that sector’s production results in lower prices for its out-
puts. By the same token, product prices for other, excluded sectors are
consequently increased.
Simultaneously however, changes in the social importance of a re-
source, as might be caused by population growth or technological
change or drought, establish a feedback loop whereby force is applied to
institutions, urging them to evolve. Resource values are among the
forces that induce changes in institutions.87 Clearly, trends toward im-
proving transferability in water provide an important example of institu-
tional reform being generated by the changing social value of water.
Thirty years ago, water marketing occurred in few places because it was
not allowed. That has changed—the institutions have changed—due to
the rising pressures that scarcity has placed on these rules. Water policy
has been advancing and is continues to do so. At the current juncture,
there is rising pressure on IOs to evolve to the next stage.
Two broad categories are readily identifiable for increasing the ac-
cess of nonagricultural sectors to IO-held water. The extent to which
these options may advance or detract from the objectives noted above
will be important to investigate in future research. The two general op-
tions are: (A) IOs can negotiate water transfers with nonagricultural buy-
ers and pursue various measures for freeing this water within their
service areas, and (B) IOs can assign water rights to their clients and
allow these right holders to transfer their water to other parties deemed
appropriate by irrigators. Recall that our focus upon “districts of origin”
means that growth-fueled demand is occurring outside the IO and de-
sired reallocation would have less water being used within the IO in or-
87. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PER-
FORMANCE (1990).
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der to enable greater out-of-IO use. Thus, a set-aside option here is
having IOs evolve into urban utilities as growth takes place.
In the following subsections, variants within these two categories
are distinguished. Subsequently, more momentous transitions are
considered.
A. IOs Negotiating with Demand Sectors
Water marketing provides important avenues for weighing the
relative value of water in different uses and makes corresponding con-
sumption adjustments on a continual basis. Although water transfer
agreements between IOs and external, nonagricultural entities have oc-
curred, there are approaches for improving both their results (mindful of
the five objectives noted previously in part XI) and the extent of transfer
activity.
The understandable tendency of IOs is to bargain with what they
actually control. Thus, their most common transactions have involved
water conserved via refurbishment of facilities, often in the form of canal
hardening to reduce permeability. Major projects have been pursued
whereby municipal utilities fund irrigation rehabilitation projects in ex-
change for the conserved water.88 Besides dealing with choices that are
feasible at the IO level, an advantageous characteristic of refurbishment,
from the IOs’ perspective, is that the received money is expended on
projects, so there is no need to deliberate and implement new mecha-
nisms for distributing new funds.
The major oversight in refurbishment arrangements has been the
perpetuation of low-valued irrigation, at values less than those paid for
rehabilitation water. Indeed, refurbishment lowers future operation and
maintenance costs, because of reductions in pumping to achieve
equivalent deliveries of water at farm gates. Because lower costs infer
future lower water rates, it is reasonable to expect future inefficiency to
be intensified at the basin-wide level. That is, irrigators will employ
more water when it is cheaper. A better approach is to design transfer
packages that engage all low-cost alternatives, to the benefit of both buy-
ers and sellers. To do otherwise is wasteful by not maximizing the value
of water and delivering this value to water users. For this to be accom-
plished at the local level, the IO must use incentives that cause irrigators
to conserve water by applying on-farm strategies.
If least-cost actions are motivated, regulatory approaches will not
be successful. For example, prohibiting a particular crop type or crop-
ping practice is not usually an attractive path. Nor is subsidizing specific
88. See generally HADDAD, supra note 33. R
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on-farm production practices. Differences among farmers and among
farms (e.g., slope, soil type, elevation) mean that efficient activities vary
by farm. Farmers are best positioned to make management choices. Poli-
cies, or modeling activities, which do not recognize this variety will not
achieve the objectives listed previously.
There are at least two paths by which IOs can work with heteroge-
neous farmers to encourage some water conservation at the least cost. In
the first, the IO charges for water on a volumetric basis. Many already
apply volumetric pricing, but contemporary rate-making seeks cost re-
covery rather than efficient water use. Hence, the norm is that water’s
value is omitted from rates.89 The level of subsidy implicit to calculated
delivery costs enlarges the problem. “The main reason why federally
supplied water in the arid West is not always managed efficiently is that
it is sold far below the cost of providing it, a characteristic that does not
engender wise husbandry.”90 To spur an appropriate amount of water
conservation, it will be necessary to raise rates to incorporate, minimally,
the omitted value of naturally occurring water. This is termed “full cost
pricing.” For any announced rate, we can have confidence that any water
conserved by a full cost pricing policy will have a productive value that
is less than the applied volumetric rate. There is some trickiness to devel-
oping an approximate charge that will consistently generate a targeted
amount of conserved water, so a second policy path would normally be
applied.
In the second approach the IO contracts with farmers for fixed
amounts of water, or the IO contracts for farming practices such as fal-
lowing that are expected to generate a computable amount of water.
Contracts can be negotiated individually, but fairness and efficiency will
be improved with public transparency and level programs. Among the
quantity-targeting possibilities are reverse auction processes in which
the IO asks farmers to submit bids, and then accepts the lowest bids91
sufficient to fulfill a desired total amount of water conservation then
available to the IO to satisfy external contracts. Smith discusses the gen-
eral idea of employing corporately styled “tender offers” whereby irriga-
89. Michelsen et al., supra note 72, at 228. R
90. WAHL, supra note 8 at 127. R
91. Of course, IOs can use whatever criteria they wish for selecting from alternative
bids. For example, bids from tail irrigators could be given preference on the basis of re-
duced conveyance losses, or bids from particular crop retirements might be preferable on a
reduced secondary economic effects basis. Also, all accepted bids could be paid on terms
set by the highest accepted bid, and there are other means of improving the gains received
by irrigators.
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tors contract with the IO to reduce their water use for a price set by the
IO.92
Imperial Irrigation District’s (IID) fallowing program during re-
cent years resembles this strategy. IID announces a per acre-foot price
and invites irrigators to submit applications to fallow their lands.93 IID’s
2010 program had a stated price of $75/acre foot and resulted in over
50,000 acre feet of water savings.94 Before presenting the IID program as
a success story, however, it should be acknowledged that the fallowing
policy is merely the currently stable outcome of a very frustrating and
expensive deliberation involving years of contention, litigation, and large
expenditures of public monies by IID, California, the BOR, and even Ari-
zona and Mexico.95
In both full cost pricing and quantity-target approaches, an eco-
nomic incentive is employed to generate water that can be transacted to
external parties. Auctioning and tender offers involve new incentives
that will apply only to farmers who are participating in reallocation, and
both possess the positive quality of addressing a water quantity target.
There can be transaction cost advantages of having the IO negotiate with
outside buyers, and irrigator-sellers may reap better terms when the IO
is acting on their collective behalf.96 Yet, only participating producers
will receive benefits in these cases unless the district applies some
“markup” in its dealings with external parties, which is to be expected
and likely warranted for various reasons. Among these are the desirabil-
ity of mitigating third-party effects that would qualify as market failures.
There are also supportive equity arguments.97
92. See Smith, supra note 16. R
93. Fallowing Programs, IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT, http://www.iid.com/index.
aspx?page=190 (last visited June 15, 2012).
94. 2010-2011 Fallowing Program, IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT, http://www.iid.com/
index.aspx?page=198 (last visited June 15, 2012).
95. See Howitt & Sunding, supra note 65, at 183–84. (Howitt and Sunding observed R
that the “transaction” underlying this program bears only a loose resemblance to water
marketing. Water conserved with this fallowing program is committed to external urban
and environmental applications, yet IID’s participation was obtained via a threatened de-
crease in their water right holdings.).
96. Michael D. Rosen & Richard J. Sexton, Irrigation Districts and Water Markets: An
Application of Cooperative Decision-Making Theory, 69 LAND ECON. 39, 43 (1993).
97. Auction procedures tend to discover least-cost and least-price sources of water
when simple auctioning mechanisms are applied. Least-cost is desirable yet least-price may
be objectionable as it may imply small net gains to participating farmers in comparison to
the rewards being generated for the external water buyers. Trades from low-valued to
high-valued water uses are socially attractive because they generate a net gain, and it is
arguable that this gain should be shared. Thus, there may be strong equity arguments for
markups conducted at the IO level. Distribution of the markup-generated profit may be
conducted in various ways by IOs.
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B. IO Members Negotiating with Demand Sectors
As noted earlier, some IOs were formed under an ownership style
in which members hold shares to delivered water. Historically, transfers
of these shares may have been limited to transactions associated with
land purchases, but IOs are often permissive regarding internal swap-
ping of shares among members.98 In the case of transferring shares to
external parties, there are more hurdles to overcome.
When farmers satisfy their irrigation demands using personally
owned shares of a cooperative’s water supply, the possession of water
rights is turned over to individual agents and the common property is-
sue of water ownership is theoretically averted unless IO policies are
prohibitive. Absent prohibitions, irrigators are able to evaluate the ap-
propriateness of their production activities in relation to the market-ex-
pressed value of water. This may motivate various, modified production
activities over time, including more careful water management, altered
crop selections, field leveling, fallowing and alternative rotations that in-
corporate more fallowing, as well as the cessation of irrigation. The idio-
syncrasies of soils, topography, farmers, and other farm features will
lead to a diversity of reactions.
It is useful to anticipate that, because the market price of water
shares will be resolved continuously by both supply and demand factors,
aggregate effects at the IO level are unlikely to be dramatic in any given
year,99 but changes will accumulate over time in concert with the magni-
tude of urban growth. Moreover, it is quite conceivable that traders will
utilize a variety of market instruments according to their combined pref-
erences. Because urban entities are engaged in planning for projected
growth and insuring themselves against drought, they are likely to inves-
tigate all permissible contracting avenues. This includes purchases,
leases, and options. In the case of purchases, urban buyers sometimes
buy in advance of growth and may engage in leasing “excess” water in
the near term, sometimes back to the seller.
Environmental buyers can have sporadic, specialized demands for
water, because they may be targeting specific stream segments or times
of year in which flows are especially low. This places more emphasis on
short-term market actions, spatially dispersed portfolios of water rights,
high altitude water rights, and stored water with the potential to be re-
98. Smith, supra note 78. R
99. The first year may be an exception due to the accrued effects of pent-up supply
and demand disequilibria. If considerable pressure has accumulated due to mounting ex-
ternal scarcity before a district liberalizes its transfer prohibitions, the periods following
relaxation can involve quick changes.
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leased on-call. These preferences modify the nature of potential trades
with environmental stewards.
A problem for IOs, albeit a manageable one, is keeping the “lights
on” as water is rededicated to external users. Accommodations have to
be made for preserving the water delivery mission and financial integrity
of IOs, even as individual shareholders pursue self-interests with their
water shares. As natural monopolies operating in a declining average
cost industry, IOs are susceptible to financial failure when revenue de-
clines. When an IO’s water deliveries are reduced, its total costs do not
rise, but the average costs of a delivered acre-foot do rise for all remain-
ing members. Because rates are acting to distribute commonly caused
costs (especially one or more pumping plants, canals, and administra-
tion) across a broad acreage and a large number of producers, the loss of
served acreage can be financially damaging.
It is important for new water management instruments to operate
without harming the well-developed capital management strategies pre-
sent in IOs. Therefore, as a foundational precept, external buyers should
acquire exactly what irrigators have to sell. In particular, irrigators who
own shares have a longstanding obligation to make contributions in the
form of payments to their IOs. It is sensible for these obligations to con-
vey to buyers as water rights are transacted,100 or there should be a sub-
stitute mechanism agreed upon by the three involved parties (irrigator,
buyer, district). For example, a buyer could negotiate a one-time pay-
ment to the IO.
Paralleling the financial problem of preserving IO functionality,
there is a water supply consideration too. Although an IO’s members
may own 100 percent of an IO’s water, the hydrological reality is that
some of the water consumption occurring in-district happens before the
water reaches field gates. Evaporation from the open water surfaces of
impoundments and canals is one type of consumption. Seepage through
canals and impoundments is another. A third is so-called “dead water”
remaining in conveyance facilities at the conclusion of an irrigation sea-
son, with potential off-season fates as evaporation, transpiration, or seep-
age prior to the onset of the next irrigation season. The sum of this off-
farm water use is not proportionately decreased as external water trans-
fers reduce in-district water use.101 Thus, just like the operation and
maintenance costs of running an IO, accommodations must be designed
to prevent harms as water is transferred to the outside.102
100. GISSER & JOHNSTON, supra note 4. R
101. Miller, supra note 10. R
102. Ronald C. Griffin, Achieving Water Use Efficiency in Irrigation Districts, 132 J. OF
WATER RESOURCES PLAN. & MGMT. 434, 434–42 (2006).
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In cases where 100 percent of water shares are held by members
and transferred water will no longer pass through the shared network, it
will be appropriate for the IO to retain some portion of the seller’s trans-
acted shares. The challenge here is to compute a suitable “tradable pro-
portion”. The idea is not to be punitive to traders, but to accommodate a
legitimate efficiency concern and to accurately account for conveyance
losses based on hydrologic knowledge.
XIII. EXTENSIONS TO MORE AGGRESSIVE STRATEGIES
The value that is embedded in the aggregate water holdings of
today’s IOs may motivate more aggressive measures than the ones just
noted. For example, in a many IO water basins, it is conceivable that a
few IOs could be induced to restructure themselves so as to take advan-
tage of new water marketing options. Interestingly, it may only take the
transition of a single irrigation IO to satisfy the urban growth of a basin
for many years.
At a base level of $125/acre foot/year such as is employed by the
2012-13 IID fallowing program, an irrigated acre using three acre feet
annually would involve an implicit water right having a capitalized
value of $9,750.103 Urban areas may be willing to pay much more. This
becomes a motivating amount of money when a number of acres are
involved. A fully irrigated 160-acre tract could be associated with more
than $1.5 million in water value for a permanent transfer of 480 acre feet,
without selling any land. These values are sufficient to raise questions
about what institutional options might exist for transforming an IO so
that irrigators may realize these values.
What nonincremental reorganizations are possible whereby IO
operations could become highly responsive to attractive urban or envi-
ronmental water offers?
A. IO Takeover
It is feasible in some states for an IO to be voluntarily subsumed
by another water district. When one inspects the history of IOs through-
out the West, many examples of modified ownership and mergers can be
found. In some places, affirmation of such modifications may require
103. At a four percentage rate of discount and no CPI-beating appreciation in the value
of water over the future, 125•3•1.04/0.04=9750. If appreciation in water value outpaces the
CPI as has generally occurred for multiple decades, the capitalized value will be higher. In
the case of Imperial, the average amount of transferable water recently credited to a fal-
lowed acre is approximately 5.2 acre feet, raising this value to $16,900. 2012-2013 Fallowing
Program, IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT, http://www.iid.com/index.aspx?page=501 (last
visited June 15, 2012).
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legislative approval. When ownership of an IO was originally in private
hands, the previous owner may have been motivated by financial gain in
shedding ownership, as has occurred in Texas.104 Subsequent to the take-
over, the new management continues to operate the newly acquired IO,
so a high level of irrigation service is initially continued. As a result of
ownership, the new administration has the ability to transfer irrigation
water to other sectors in its client base over time.
Takeover may be disappointing in terms of its ability to coax eco-
nomic efficiency out of either on-farm activities or intersectoral transfers
(now internal) of water. Newly structured incentives are not automati-
cally established by this change. Unless rate systems are revised or an-
other form of scarcity signaling is substituted, efficient allocation will
continue to be elusive. If the acquiring IO operates under diffused own-
ership of water rights and is charged with serving multiple sectors, it
becomes possible for future reallocation to be achieved “in house.”
Yet, the political, nonmarket style of administration necessarily
conducted by such IOs provides no guarantee that these reallocations
will be efficient, either in result or process. Furthermore, the diffusion of
water right ownership is actually aggravated in this situation, given the
enlarged clientele of the buyer. Should the expenses or debt accompany-
ing acquisitions be large, cost recovery objectives may motivate the or-
ganization to revise rates upwards, potentially developing new pricing
signals for all customers. This can be helpful. Yet, it is also possible for
the rewards of better water allocation to be cannibalized by the organiza-
tion if it operates at high cost. The objective of efficient water allocation
is to maximize the rewards received from water in a basin, not to foster
expensive authorities that prevent water’s rewards from reaching
consumers.
104. See L.S. COPLIN ET. AL., U.S. DEPT. OF THE INT., Measurement of Flows for Two Irriga-
tion Districts in the Lower Colorado River Basin, Texas (1996), available at http://www.twdb.
state.tx.us/rwpg/rpgm_rpts/95483103.pdf. The Lower Colorado River Authority (LCRA)
purchased Gulf Coast Water Company in 1960, Lakeside Irrigation Company in 1983, and
Garwood Irrigation Company in 1998. See GRIFFIN, supra note 50, at 49–77 (Based on irri- R
gated acreage at the time of these three transactions, LCRA would be in a position to sup-
ply irrigation water for 86,000 acres, much of it originally committed to rice production and
therefore involving a substantial amount of water. Subsequently, rate contracts with irriga-
tors transitioned to an “interruptible” basis. This means that irrigators face lower volumet-
ric charges than do municipalities but deliveries can be suspended during dry weather
conditions.).
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B. Deregulatory Division
As has occurred in the electricity industry,105 it is technically feasi-
ble to deregulate IOs by introducing a new administrative entity and
assigning to it the water rights held by an IO, effectively dividing the IO
into two houses. The prior IO will continue to exist, managing water
infrastructure and performing water delivery functions as it always has.
Referring here to the new entity as the “water company,” this organiza-
tion will be expected to pursue profit and will distribute its earnings to
its shareowners. Presumably, irrigators are the strongest candidates for
being the shareholders of the created water company.106 The water com-
pany will contract with external sectors for water right exchanges (tem-
porary or permanent), and it will sell water to the IO as well. The water
company will not be involved in IO management.
Irrigators will pay higher rates for their water use than they do
prior to deregulation, and these rates will incorporate water value (for
the first time!). The great majority of irrigators should experience gains
under this arrangement, provided that the initially endowed shares are
largely allocated to irrigators and the administrative costs of the com-
pany are kept in check. That is, ownership of water company shares im-
plicitly entitles each irrigator to a share of water, while the higher rate
paid for irrigation water invites conservation. When each irrigator’s im-
plicit share is larger than the irrigator’s revised water use, there is a po-
tential for gain.
Faced with the possibility of deregulatory division, IO leaders
may be provoked to adopt a more progressive management style, so as
to improve water-based income via external transfers. The several other
policies inventoried here offer options. Irrigators should be readily pla-
cated by such actions and the motivation for division would subside.
C. Self-Dissolution
One tactic available to the members of an IO may be to collec-
tively exit the irrigation business and sell off the assets of the IO. Simi-
larly, they could shut down all infrastructure, cease irrigation operations,
and continue to manage their water right holdings on a for-profit basis
105. See W. M. WARWICK, U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, A PRIMER ON ELECTRIC UTILITIES, DER-
EGULATION, AND RESTRUCTURING OF U.S. ELECTRICITY MARKETS (2002) (offering an introduc-
tion to utility restructuring, competitive energy markets, and new options for energy
management).
106. Other interesting candidates for receiving partial shares include local government,
if there is desire to compensate secondary and tax effects of irrigation reductions, and the
IO if there is uncertainty about the effects of this policy.
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through leases and options. While appearing rather extreme for an IO
serving tens of thousands of acres, this may be a compelling path for
small districts or ditch companies as well as the water buyers that they
might do business with. Making such “chunks” of water rights available
to urban areas and environmental contractors may serve to substantially
alleviate regional demand stress and thereby limit reform pressure on
the region’s remaining IOs. Another advantage is that the water con-
served by eliminating conveyance losses is also marketable under a dis-
solution strategy.
XIV. THE POLICY OPPORTUNITY SET
Table 3 lists the various strategies discussed above and compiles
brief responses to basic questions about their character. Seven possibili-
ties are included. The first three are approaches that rely on organiza-
tion-level negotiation with outside interests. The final “Self-Dissolution”
strategy can also be regarded as a type of “IO Negotiation.” The various
columns of the table collect some informal observations of relevance
when contemplating preferred paths.
Because it may be objectionable to impose change upon irrigators,
a crucial feature of any policy option can be whether it is beneficial to
irrigators. Two columns of the table pertain to this matter: “Gains to Irri-
gators” and “Gains to Nonparticipating Irrigators.”
The final two columns are of interest in cases where political sup-
port from nonirrigators is needed to gain approval of a policy modifica-
tion. When the impact upon agribusinesses and food production is
negative, there could be impetus for two reactions on the part of those
championing greater trading. The first is confronting, at least in the pro-
cess of deliberations, the idea of prospective gains in the area of receipt
vis-a`-vis the likely losses in the area of origin. After all, for a large ac-
counting stance (e.g., a state or basin) the net effects on economically
connected businesses and people will ordinarily be positive, because
gains in the area of receipt will more than offset, and arguably “dwarf”107
losses in the area of origin.
107. Robert A. Young, Local and Regional Economic Impacts, in WATER SCARCITY: IMPACTS
ON WESTERN AGRICULTURE 244, 245 (Ernest A. Engelbert & Ann Foley Scheuring, eds., 1984).
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TABLE 3. Properties of Alternative Transfer Strategies
Transfer Strategy 
Has
Occurred
Establishes
New
Incentives
Gains to 
Irrigators
Gains to 
Nonparticipating
Irrigators1
Gains to Local 
Agribusiness2
Impact on 
Value of Ag 
Production
A. IO
Negotiation 
Refurbishment
projects ? X modest and in the future 
modest and 
declining once 
completed 
?
Repricing ? ? variable across farms negative ?
Contracts with 
members ? ?
yes; amount 
depends on 
contract design 
maybe; depends 
on contract design 
negative ?
B. Member
Negotiation ? ? modest 
variable; depends 
on policy 
negative ?
C. IO Takeover ? X unlikely negative ?
D. Deregulatory
Division 
X ? high if irrigators own sufficient shares negative ?
E. Self-
Dissolution 
X ? variable highly negative ? ?
1Some of the identified strategies affect all clients of the IO, so a separate entry is not provided within this column. 
2It is assumed here that agribusinesses receive no compensation as part of the transfer strategy. 
The second reaction to the issue of reduced agricultural produc-
tion is to search for policy designs that add mechanisms for mitigating
secondary economic effects on agribusinesses and local governments in
the areas of origin. Indeed, one of the tasks that may be advisable for
future research in this area is to compile and analyze methods for accom-
plishing such mitigation. Although legislatures have tended to adopt
regulatory protections, there may be an array of contractual modifica-
tions that are both practical and capable of alleviating concerns over this
problem.
XV. CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS
The tenures of IOs have been filled with many trials, yet they have
enabled considerable social good in producing food and generating eco-
nomic development. Now they are being pressured to relax their hold on
a hard-earned resource they regard as critical. Many IOs are very reluc-
tant to respond, but as their memberships witness wider opportunities
for their managed assets than merely food production, the urge to evolve
can emerge from within. Some feel that change will be imposed on IOs if
they fail to respond. There are many legal, policy, and contractual op-
tions for accomplishing this change. In choosing from the available op-
tions, a single strategy will not suit all situations. The solutions compiled
here represent an initial itemization, and further adjustments to these
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMN\52-2\NMN206.txt unknown Seq: 36  8-NOV-12 8:40
312 NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL [Vol. 52
options via blending and refinements are possible, even probable. Mar-
ket participants can be especially creative.
The amount of water administered by Western United States IOs
is too vast to be threatened, and it is too important to fully transfer out of
agriculture. Hence, responsible reallocation can easily pursue the most
practical paths in whatever dimensions are practical. Of particular con-
cern can be reallocative possibilities where: (1) there is considerable sepa-
ration between the marginal value of in-district and out-of-district water,
and/or (2) transaction costs for achieving transfers are low.
The first dimension suggests targeting situations of high urban
growth, high environmental demand, and low agricultural productivity.
For example, cities embarking on expensive water developments, includ-
ing desalinization, as part of their portfolio of management instruments
(both supply-side and demand-side of course) should periodically
reevaluate the use of newly designed deals with IOs. Some environmen-
tal demands might be well addressed through trades in higher elevation
locales where irrigation tends to be devoted to low-valued activities due
to shortened seasons and smaller irrigable land parcels. For such transac-
tions, previous irrigation water can be left instream and may remain in
the watercourse for a long distance downstream. Environmental stew-
ards can readily leverage their water operations because of their interest
in relatively nonconsumptive uses. For example, they can collaborate
with downstream urban demand centers, with upstream water acquisi-
tions capable of fulfilling both environmental demands during its pas-
sage and urban demands upon its arrival at downstream diversion
points. Joint possibilities such as these imply that the purchased value of
water rights can be the sum of the separate values.
The second dimension is illuminated by the studies of IOs con-
ducted to date. Among other observations, the costs of getting transfer
deals done are lower in some circumstances than others. Overall, a
maxim of the fewer the number of transactors, the better applies. Dif-
fused responsibilities and common property arrangements for water
right ownership in many IOs limit transfer opportunities because of the
number of parties that have to be paid or convinced. Thus, smaller IOs
can be better business partners. Also, the mutual/ditch company form of
an IO is a clearly preferred partner due to the concentrated ownership
that is fostered by their institutions. The possibility of embarking on land
transactions should not be overlooked in this context. Where upper basin
ranches or farms own shares of small, water delivery companies, the
possibility of acquiring agricultural land properties and reallocating both
land and water may be a cost-effective tactic.
When investigating potential IO traders, it becomes sensible to re-
search the IO’s past funding mechanisms to discover how diffused own-
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ership may be. When property owners and not merely irrigators have
been paying IO bills, ownership of rights may be more diffused than is
immediately apparent. The organization’s voting mechanisms (per farm
vs. per acre vs. per citizen) for selecting board members is also evidence
of differentially diffused ownership and uneven capacities for respond-
ing to marketing offers.108
Many irrigation developments were federally assisted, and for
some organizations it remains true that federal control continues over
some aspect(s) of their water. This is especially true with California and
Arizona IOs,109 but it may also be true for other regions, including the
upper basin districts of the Colorado River basin. In most cases external
buyers should therefore avoid approaching IOs that have not achieved
separation from federal authority over water unless other options are
quite limited.
Finally, all mechanisms for sponsoring greater flexibility within
IOs should nurture sensitivity for the mission of these entities and the
problems they face. As observed previously, reductions in water deliv-
eries can detract from a district’s viability. There are both economic and
hydrologic effects upon the IO. Both require accommodations, but these
can be built into new policy frameworks without great difficulty. As a
related issue, it may be politically important to acknowledge the sensitiv-
ities that surround prospective local declines in agricultural production,
especially as they may influence agribusinesses and tax revenues. Yet,
there are policy accommodations available for mitigating some of these
effects, and it is wise not to overrestrict transfer activity in light of the
rising resource pressures.
108. See Richard J. McCann & David Zilberman, Governance Rules and Management Deci-
sions in California’s Irrigation Districts, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WATER PRICING RE-
FORMS 79 (Ariel Dinar, ed., 2000).
109. Memorandum by Dean Price on The Legal and Historical Obstacles to Out-of-Dis-
trict Transfers from Arizona Irrigation Districts on the Mainstream Colorado River (Apr. 2,
2010) (on file with author).
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